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003 Nust
005 20170111154343.0
008 140320s2014 njua b 001 0 eng
010 _a 2014000415
020 _a9780691159157 (hardcover : acidfree paper)
020 _a9780691159164 (softcover)
040 _aDLC
_beng
_cDLC
_erda
_dDLC
042 _apcc
043 _ae-gb---
_ae-gx---
_ae-ur---
_an-us---
050 0 0 _aJF1525.I6
_bY37 2014
082 0 0 _a327.12
_bYAR
084 _aPOL011000
_aHIS037070
_2bisacsh
100 1 _aYarhi-Milo, Keren,
_d1978-
245 1 0 _aKnowing the adversary :
_bleaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations /
_cKeren Yarhi-Milo.
264 1 _aPrinceton, New Jersey :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c2014.
300 _axi, 355 pages :
_billustrations ;
_c25 cm.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
490 0 _aPrinceton studies in international history and politics
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 259-344) and index.
505 0 _aTheories of intentions and the problem of attention -- Indicators of Nazi Germany's intentions and the coming of World War II, 1934-39 -- British decision makers' perceptions of Nazi Germany's intentions -- The British intelligence community's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions -- The Carter era and the collapse of detente, 1977-80 -- US decision makers' perceptions of Soviet intentions : the collapse of detente -- The US intelligence community's assessments of Soviet intentions : the collapse of detente -- Indicators of Soviet intentions and the end of the Cold War, 1985-88 -- US decision makers' perceptions of Soviet intentions : the end of the Cold War -- The US intelligence community's assessments of Soviet intentions : the end of the Cold War -- Summary and implications.
520 _a" States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework--called selective attention--that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do. Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security. "--
_cProvided by publisher.
650 0 _aIntelligence service.
650 0 _aInternational relations.
650 0 _aWorld politics
_y20th century.
650 0 _aDetente.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General.
_2bisacsh
650 7 _aHISTORY / Modern / 20th Century.
_2bisacsh
651 0 _aGreat Britain
_xForeign relations
_y1936-1945.
651 0 _aGreat Britain
_xForeign relations
_zGermany.
651 0 _aGermany
_xForeign relations
_zGreat Britain.
651 0 _aUnited States
_xForeign relations
_y1945-1989.
651 0 _aUnited States
_xForeign relations
_zSoviet Union.
651 0 _aSoviet Union
_xForeign relations
_zUnited States.
906 _a7
_bcbc
_corignew
_d1
_eecip
_f20
_gy-gencatlg
942 _2ddc
_cBK